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Abstract 
This article looks at how managers in large infrastructure projects in The Netherlands deal with 
difficult choices, which are labelled as dilemmas in this article, in their managerial activities. It 
presents the results of a survey of 32 managers in 18 complex decision-making projects in which 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) play an important role. The managers were presented with a 
number of choices and asked to rate the amount of attention they paid to each of the choices. The 
article focuses on four (groups of) dilemmas managers face in the inter-organizational context of 
these processes: (1) interaction with parties, (2) strategic orientation, (3) management style and 
(4) process dynamics.  
After a brief elaboration of the role of (network) managers in complex PPP projects and the 
nature of the dilemmas they face, the four groups of dilemmas are explored by looking at how 
managers scored on the dilemmas within each group. Conclusions are drawn about managers’ 
perceptions of these dilemmas and the differences between projects. The different choices of 
dilemmas are then compared with the differences between the scores of the outputs of the 
projects as perceived by the managers. Finally, general conclusions are made about the dilemmas 
chosen by managers and the consequences of these choices. 
 
Points for practioners:  
Pay attention to commitment, goals searching, communication and vertical relations if you 
want good outcomes in complex environmental projects 
Do managers of complex spatial and environmental projects in general choose to open up the 
decision-making process for stakeholders to enhance support and use the knowledge of 
stakeholders or do they choose for a more closed decision-making process that reduces the 
number of actors and might speed up the decision-making process? In general one can see many 
of these managerial choices between a more project oriented style, that focuses on control, 
specifying goals, keeping the budget etc, and a more process oriented style that focuses on 
activating actors, creating support, or exploring possible content.  
If we look at the 32 managerial strategies that were researched, there are a few strategies that are 
positively and strongly correlated to positive perceived outcomes of projects: commitment, goals 
searching, vertical relationships and communication.  
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1. Introduction: Management dilemmas in PPP projects 
 
Public private partnerships (PPP) can be found in many countries all over the world and the 
popularity of this form of co-operation continues to rise. Just as in other countries (see Osborne, 
2000; Sullivan/Skelcher, 2002), PPPs have received a substantial amount of attention in the 
Netherlands. For the most part these projects are in the field of urban reconstruction and renewal 
or are infrastructure projects (Ecorys, 2002; Kenniscentrum 2002; Klijn et al 2006). This gives 
them a special character since most of these environmental or spatial projects tend to be rather 
complicated (Klijn, 2003; Healy, 2003; Innes and Boother, 2004; Klijn, et al 2006): 
- They are characterized by multi-level governance because several levels of public actors 
and decisions are involved, including at the local, regional and central levels; 
- there are many actors involved, including public, private and societal actors, who all want 
to influence the decision-making process; 
- they involve a variety of values (economic, transport, environmental, liveability) 
represented by different actors (sector ministries, environmental groups, citizen 
groups, economic stakeholders) that have to be reconciled; 
- they have an ambiguous character in the sense that the actors involved all have a different 
understanding of the main problems but also in the sense that ideas about the 
problems and solutions change over time; 
- Different projects in the same area can be connected in several ways, thus further 
complicating the decision-making process. 
 
Public Private Partnerships: forms and definitions 
Public private partnerships are based on the idea that extra value can be obtained by combining 
knowledge and co-production (Savas, 2000; Osborne, 2000; Hodge and Greve, 2005). Various 
definitions of PPPs can be found in the literature. This article utilises the following definition of 
a PPP:  a cooperation between public and private actors in which actors develop mutual 
products and/or services and in which risk, costs and benefits are shared (compare Klijn & 
Teisman, 2003). Various forms of PPPs can be found in the literature as well as in the real world. 
In most publications, a distinction is made between PPP concessions or contracts and the PPP as 
an organisational cooperation project or partnership (Teisman, 1998; Osborne, 2000; 
Kenniscentrum, 2002; Hodge/Greve, 2005).  
- In a PPP concession the design, building, financing and commercial operation of an 
infrastructure project (such as a road or a building like a school) are integrated into a contract. 
The added value lies in the lower cost of coordination between the various components (often 
expressed as efficiency or value for money gains). Even though these efficiencies are necessary 
for a PPP concession, they are insufficient to attract private or public sector interest. Their point 
of interest arises from the opportunity to create substantive added value. For example, the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) tendering system used in the UK for the design, build, finance and 
operation of road construction bundles is contracted out to private consortia for a period of 30 
years. The consortium is able to use more sustainable (expensive) building materials to save on 
future maintenance costs (Haynes/Roden, 1999). The payment system rewards the ‘availability’ 
of roads (NAO, 2001; NAO 2003) rather than second-guessing the cost of constructing them. 
The opportunity for long-term involvement in a project provides the potential for devising new 
solutions to problems and protects against a risk aversion to untested approaches. 
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- In a PPP as organisational cooperation project, separate activities are integrated to create 
added value. In this case, the PPP is a partnership. This type of cooperation is usually found in 
urban reconstruction and regeneration projects, where measures to strengthen transport are 
combined with measures aimed at improving the living environment and/or housing as well as 
measures aimed at strengthening the economy. With this method of cooperation, added value is 
generated by combining substantive activities and projects which then reinforce one another. 
This also makes it possible to achieve a financial trade-off between profitable and less profitable 
but socially interesting components.  
 
In these two forms of PPPs, the method of co-production is regulated in different ways. In the 
contract form, there is limited co-production between public and private actors. This primarily 
consists of interaction at the beginning of a PPP project regarding the basic principles of the 
project that will be contracted out. This mode of cooperation is a variation of the traditional 
method of contract allocation. Here, attempts are made to increase added value for both the 
public and private parties through new forms of the contract relationship. Ideas about new 
contract forms have cropped up in a large number of countries but have been worked out in 
particular detail in the UK’s PFI projects, with a variety of isomorphic processes leading to their 
adoption elsewhere (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For instance, the ideas of the Dutch expertise 
centre for PPP, a prominent PPP think tank that existed from 1998 to 2005 as a part of the 
Ministry of Finance, have been largely adopted from the English PFI model (Klijn et all, 2007). 
The preconditions for success with this type of approach to co-production are that the public 
party should be able to specify the problem (though not the solution, which would be the case in 
a traditional contractual arrangement) and that clear rules for the tendering process exist (Klijn, 
2002). The organizational cooperation constructions, or partnerships, model of PPP involves a 
far more intensive interaction because the various project components that are often the domain 
of diverse private and public actors have to be coordinated. Moreover, it is more difficult to 
clearly delineate in advance the content and ambitions of the cooperation. 
In observing the Dutch situation, a clear distinction has to be made between the policy debate 
and the actual projects (see Klijn/Teisman, 2003; Klijn and van Twist, 2007). On the policy level 
the discussion is mostly dominated by the contractual form of PPP. The afore-mentioned 
knowledge centre PPP, which dominated the discussion, stressed the value of new DFBM 
contracts and the fact that clear political goals and a new type of administration are required to 
manage these contracts. Thus, although there is a generally favourable attitude in the Netherlands 
towards PPPs, with several projects (almost all in the sphere of infrastructure and housing) 
having been labelled as key examples of PPP in the last few decades, the government rhetoric 
has been to try and stimulate the contractual form of PPP.  However, there are only a limited 
number (certainly not more then 10) of contractual forms that resemble the UK PFI projects, 
although this number is growing slowly (see Klijn/Van Twist, 2007). Most of the PPP projects in 
the Netherlands are loosely coupled forms of partnership. It is in these forms that complex 
decision-making processes, which are the objects of our research, can be found. Eighteen of the 
well known complex PPP projects in the Netherlands have been selected as the focus of this 
article on research on managerial behaviour. 
 
Management of PPP: the need for active managerial strategies 
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Most PPPs, and certainly the ones in this study, are fairly complex and therefore require 
substantial managerial efforts in order to succeed. This is no easy task. A large number of 
strategies have been utilised to guide and steer complex policy processes in general and PPPs in 
particular (see Gage/Mandel, 1990; Kickert et al, 1979; Osborne, 2000; Agranoff/McGuire, 
2001; Meier/O’ Toole, 2001). While research has made it clear that the managerial activities in a 
PPP are crucial for its functioning and success (Osborne, 2000; Klijn/Teisman 2003; 
Hodge/Greve, 2005), it is less clear which managerial choices are the right ones that will result in 
good outcomes. 
Managers of PPPs also are often required to make difficult managerial choices that can be seen 
and experienced as dilemmas. For instance, should they be generous in the inclusion of actors or 
should they deny access to certain actors? Should they strive for decisiveness and a speedy 
process or should they take their time to garner support from the actors involved? Should they be 
resolute about the content of the project and the course it is to take, or should they demonstrate 
flexibility and allow content to depend upon external circumstances? In short, there are many 
difficult choices and options to consider for managers who are responsible for complex PPPs. 
 
Elaborating managerial strategies in PPP projects 
This article aims to shed light on managerial choices in complex PPP projects and the dilemmas 
that managers face in utilising strategies. The research question is: “What choices do managers 
make to manage complex PPP projects? Which choices seem to have the character of a dilemma 
and how are these managerial choices related to the (perceived) outcomes of these projects?”  
To answer these questions, data was collected using the results of a questionnaire administered to 
32 managers of 18 large PPP projects in the Netherlands. The respondents were asked which 
strategies they considered to be important. The strategies were presented in pairs, but each ‘pole’ 
of the pair was measured separately so that the impact of each strategy could be assessed on its 
own while we could also assess whether the choice had the character of a dilemma. A more in 
depth explanation of the research is presented in Section 3. The role of the network manager in 
complex spatial PPP projects is discussed in Section 2 where the concept of a dilemma is 
elaborated on as well. Section 4 contains an analysis of which managerial choices managers 
think are important. Section 5 broaches the question of which pairs of choices managers consider 
to be dilemmas. In Section 6, the relationship between management choices and managers’ 
perceived outcomes is discussed.  
 
 
2. Network Management, Strategic Choices and Dilemmas 
 
Public private partnership projects are fairly complex and this is certainly the case for the 
projects studied in this paper. Decision-making in PPP projects takes place within networks of 
actors (Klijn/Teisman, 2003; Osborne, 2000). Due to the complexity of these networks, 
achieving mutually agreeable results is not easy. Given the problem of collective action, network 
interactions lack a ‘self executing’ character (Olson, 1965). Since cooperation and the 
coordination of goals and interests do not occur of their own accord, it is necessary to 
deliberately steer and manage interactions within networks. In the literature on governance and 
networks, these managerial strategies are generally referred to as network management (Kickert, 
et all, 1997; Mandell, 2001; Agranoff/McGuire, 2001; Meier/O’ Toole 2001) However, there is 
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some scope for self steering within processes of interaction. Network management does not 
imply that everything has to be strictly controlled and organized (Klijn/Edelenbos, 2006).  
 
The need for network management 
The role of the network manager differs from the traditional image of a manager. Because of the 
absence of a clear organizational context, fewer (or completely non-existent) hierarchies and 
greater differences in perceptions of problems, solutions and division of costs, the role of the 
network manager is more one of facilitating interactions, connecting actors and arenas and 
furthering the content (see Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004).  
Various management strategies have been identified in the literature (Agranoff/McGuire, 2001; 
Meier and O‘Toole, 2001). The available strategies can be categorized as strategies of process 
management (Gage and Mandell (eds.), 1990; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Process management 
involves facilitating the interactions between actors in policy games. This includes steering 
strategies aimed at bringing different actors’ perceptions together, coordinating interactions and 
other activities. A crucial factor is that while these strategies are indirect in the sense that they try 
to facilitate interactions, they consider the structure of the network and the rules as given. There 
are also direct strategies aimed at actors and interactions. Managers are assumed to be confronted 
with choices time and again when choosing strategies. For example, do they select strategies to 
enhance the involvement of parties or do they select strategies that enhance control over the 
project? It is also assumed that at least some of these choices have the nature of a dilemma. In 
order to elaborate on this point, we must first understand what is meant by a dilemma. 
 
Dilemmas: What are they really? 
A dilemma is often described as a state in which a choice must be made between two 
alternatives, both of which have major problems. However, a dilemma does not by definition 
have to be limited to the difficult problem of choosing between two evils (Hampton-Turner, 
1990). It does not only concern the situation of the man who faces an abyss and hears the wolves 
howling behind him. A dilemma can also involve weighing between good and good: the classic 
matter of the mule that has to choose between two bales of hay. 
Whether it concerns a choice between two evil and two good -- even attractive -- alternatives, a 
dilemma is a thorny issue. This is clear from the clarification Hampden-Turner provides in his 
definition (1990:9): “Di’lemma is from Greek meaning ‘two propositions’. These seemingly 
‘opposed’ propositions are converging upon us simultaneously. If we give exclusive attention to 
either one of the pair, the other is likely to impale us.” A good example is the choice between 
whether to involve many stakeholders in complex processes or to limit the number of 
stakeholders, a choice that is often discussed in the literature on complex processes (Young, 
2000). Involving many stakeholders can increase the support and quality of the content, because 
more information becomes available and stakeholders do not use their possible veto powers, but 
can also come at the expense of the speed of decision-making. Limiting the number of 
stakeholders, on the other hand, can speed up decision-making but may come at the cost of 
support and the quality of content. It is often presented in the literature as a choice that cannot 
combine both values (speed and support) (De Bruijn et all, 1998).  
On the surface, a dilemma appears to us in the form of a complex problem, an ambiguous 
situation that is difficult to solve. At a deeper level, it concerns a difficult choice between two (or 
more) alternatives that are irreconcilable. A dilemma basically involves a clash of values. 
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A dilemma can thus be viewed as a special form of choice in which a complex issue manifests 
itself, that is, in a form where the complexity of the issue emerges from a conflict between 
values. The concept of dilemma is applicable to complex problem situations if and to the extent 
that it involves a choice between different, conflicting values that are difficult or not at all 
reconcilable. In the end, a dilemma essentially involves conflicting values, or ‘competing values’ 
(see Quinn et al., 1996). 
 
Management Choices: the distinction between project and process management 
What kinds of choices are managers in complex PPP projects likely to encounter? The literature 
on internal management does not provide much information about this since the management of 
these projects is very different from internal management processes (see Mandel, 1990; Kickert 
et all, 1997; Koppenjan/Klijn, 2004). Thus, a different kind of literature has to be researched in 
order to base possible managerial choices on. An interesting source for constructing managerial 
strategies and choices is the literature on process/network and project management on complex 
decision-making (Mandell, 2001; Meier & O’Toole, 2001; De Bruijn et all, 1998; Meredith & 
Mantel, 2000; Mantel, 2005) 
Project management is very focused on controlling the phases according to five features: the 
quality of the content, costs, time, organization and information (Meredith, 2000; Meredith and 
Mantel, 2005). When each phase is passed through, this is signified by a basis document which 
identifies the results from the previous phase, as well as the demands and approach for the 
subsequent phase. The result of each phase is assessed according to the basis document. Project 
management is primarily concerned with controlling the project internally and is less concerned 
with a continual interaction with the external environment. Here, it is taken for granted that 
problems and solutions (within certain limits) are rather stable. This makes it possible to use 
project management techniques such as clear goals, a timeline, clear conditions and an end 
product that is defined ad hoc.  
In comparison to this idea of project management, the idea of process/network management can 
also be found in the literature on large projects. This perspective stresses the dynamics of 
decision-making and interdependency on other actors. Process management focuses more on 
strategies to involve other actors, create variety in content to enhance the attractiveness of 
proposals and ways to connect interactions between actors (Gage/Mandell, 1990; Kickert et all, 
1997; De Bruijn et all, 1998; Agranoff/McGuire, 2001; 2003).  
These two, sometimes fairly different approaches can be considered when writing about complex 
projects and tensions can often be observed in the literature between possible strategies 
belonging to the two approaches. The problem then becomes that these projects require clear 
goals to proceed but they also need the flexibility of incorporating stakeholders’ interests along 
the way. There is therefore a tension between goal realization that calls for setting clear goals 
and goal searching which calls for rough goals that can be worked out later on (De Bruijn et all, 
1998; Klijn et all, 2006). This choice can be construed as a managerial problem to be solved but 
it can also be seen as a managerial choice which can take the form of a dilemma (for example, 
goal realization versus goal searching). 
In comparing the project management approach with the process management approach, many 
such managerial choices can be found which appear to be difficult to be reconciled. In this paper, 
a number of managerial strategies were isolated from a wide range of literature on project and 
process management to construct a number of managerial choices. These choices thus generally 
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reflect the tension between a more project-oriented managerial choice and a more process-
oriented one. Managers may even be seen to consistently make one particular choice from our 
available range of constructed choices and thus tend to emphasis project management more than 
process management. In general, authors tend to identify public managers with process 
management because they tend to favour the involvement of stakeholders and private managers 
with project management since they prefer decisiveness, speed and efficiency. If this is correct, 
(some) differences in the strategic choices of public and private managers will be seen. Since the 
backgrounds of the managers interviewed were tracked, some reflections can be made on this 
issue.  
 
The constructed choices 
In the period before the research project, a preliminary set of choices were tested among a varied 
population of managers, civil servants and experts (see Klijn et all, 2006).a Based on this 
preliminary investigation and the literature on project and process management, 16 managerial 
choices were constructed that fit into four interesting categories that were selected from the 
literature. These are: 
1. Interaction with parties: this category concentrates on how parties are involved in the 
preparation and execution of spatial structuring projects. Questions that arise here 
include: on what basis are parties involved in a spatial structuring project? What is the 
relationship between the project and the environment with stakeholders? 
2. Strategic orientation: this category concerns the strategy of the project leadership with 
regard to issues such as communication, executing research, closing contracts, etc. 
Questions that arise here include: how are agreements between the project leadership and 
stakeholders drawn up? What style of communication has been established between the 
project and the environment? How are unclear issues investigated? 
3. Style of management: this category draws attention to how the project/process manager 
approaches the issue. Elements that play a role here include the degree of flexibility in the 
way the process manager operates and the degree to which the process manager is 
oriented on creating fruitful relationships with other actors (both members of the project 
organization as outsiders). 
4. Process dynamics: this category concentrates on how managers within spatial projects 
deal with the whimsicalities of the process of cooperation. This includes issues such as: 
steering for process or for content, working towards a certain outcome or an open view 
with regard to the outcome of cooperation and committing early to certain proscribed 
values in dealing with issues versus holding on to a certain degree of freedom. 
 
Within each category four managerial choices were identified. These choices are presented in 
Table 1 
 
Table 1. Management choices 
Category Choices Explanation 
1. Interaction with 
parties 
Involvement - manageability To involve stakeholders or not and focus on control in terms of time 
and money. 
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Representation - variety Selecting actors based on their representation versus selecting actors 
on the basis of ensuring maximum variety and information. 
Horizontal relations - vertical 
relations 
Emphasis on the hierarchical relationships between actors and project 
managers or on the horizontal relationships. 
Openness – closed-ness Wide access to other actors or restricted access. 
Support - decisiveness Attention paid to garnering support from other actors or to achieving 
results quickly. 
Communication - conflict Conflicts of interest are to be fought out or avoided and bridged by 
communication.  
Joint fact-finding – a stand-
alone process 
Information collected in a joint fact-finding process or each actor 
collects his own information. 
2. Strategic 
orientation 
Trust - contracts Interactions aimed at achieving solid agreements in contracts or based 
more on mutual trust. 
Results - interaction Actions are mainly aimed at achieving results or at achieving good 
relations. 
Internal - external The orientation is more internal (the project organization itself) or 
external (other actors involved). 
Reactive - proactive The manager is more likely to react to other initiatives or takes 
initiative himself. 
3. Style of 
management 
Flexible - determined The project manager has clear goals or adapts to new circumstances. 
Content - process Project interactions are more focused on content (initiating and seeing 
to quality) or process (types of interactions, roles, etc). 
Goal realization - goal 
searching 
Interaction is aimed at achieving detailed goals or has more rough 
goals that can be worked out later to combine actors’ goals. 
Designing - developing Solutions are achieved through conscious design or through 
interactions with stakeholders in the process. 
4. Process dynamics 
Commitment - discretion Actors are bound to the project or allowed freedom to manoeuvre. 
 
Each of the above poles can be seen as a strategic choice that managers have to make in the 
implementation of a project. Thus, if their score on involvement is high, this means they pay 
much attention to this aspect in their strategy. The research was aimed at answering several 
questions: 
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- Which choices do managers pay the most attention to? 
- Do managers experience dilemmas in these choices? 
- How is the attention to managerial choices related to perceived outcomes (that is, which 
choices correlate with a high satisfaction of outcomes)? 
 
These are questions that have not been addressed much in Public Administration research until 
now. The literature on dilemmas is generally not really empirical and information on the 
relationship between managerial choices in complex decision-making processes and outcomes is 
certainly scarce (for an exception see Meier/O‘Toole, 2001). 
 
 
3. Methodological issues and research methods 
 
Case selections and measuring dilemmas 
As indicated above, the aim of this research is to identify the choices that managers make in 
coping with the complexities of PPP projects and see if these choices appear to be dilemmas for 
them. The research also aims to relate managers’ choices to their perceptions of the outcomes. A 
total of 18 projects were selected from the well known lists of Dutch PPP projects.  This is a 
reasonable sample of the total projects of this type in the Netherlands although the exact 
percentage of all infrastructural PPP projects is not known since there is no official list of such 
projects. However, an optimistic guess is that there are about 60 of these large PPP projects in 
the Netherlands (see Ecorys, 2002; Kenniscentrum 2002 which come to slightly over 50 projects 
in the Netherlands in 2002), which makes a selection of 18 seem reasonable. Variation was 
achieved by selecting different type of projects (see below). The limited number of large PPP 
projects means that the total sample of managers active in large infrastructure projects is fairly 
limited as well. In the end, material was collected from 32 managers of these 18 infrastructure 
public-private cooperative projects. Selection was based on four criteria: 
• development of environmental space was the central issue; 
• projects were characterized by a variety of actors and interests; 
• projects were characterized by a combination of environmental functions and the need for 
innovative environmental solutions; 
• Public private cooperation was an important feature of the project. 
 
The 18 selected projects can be categorized as road projects, area development projects and 
combination projects. These are presented in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2: The 18 selected cases categorized by project type 
Road project Area development Combination 
A4 Zuid Hart van de Heuvelrug Den Haag Central 
A 59 Arnhem Rijnboog A2 passage 
N201 Delft Zuidpoort Arnhem Central 
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Maastricht Belvédère Delft railway zone 
Groningen Meerstad Amsterdam Zuidas  
Roerdelta Sijtwende 
Wieringerrandmeer Utrecht station area 
 
 W4 project 
 
 
Thus, the selections made were really of complex decision-making processes, as the assumption 
was that the difficulty of managerial choices and the possibilities of dilemmas in these choices 
were more likely to be present in these processes. 
The various poles of the choices were measured by statements that were presented to the 
managers. Each pole was measured by three statements. A list of four themes, each with four 
dilemmas (with each dilemma consisting of two poles) resulted in a questionnaire with 4 x 4 x 2x 
3 = 96 statements (see Appendix 1 for some examples of the items). Additional items on 
outcomes (on both content and process) were added to these statements. Respondents could 
choose a score of most certainly to most certainly not (on a 5 point scale).  The score for each 
pole of the choice was measured separately. This allowed us to look at the relationship between 
the two poles (e.g. openness versus closure) but also provided an opportunity to look at the 
relationship of each pole (as an indication of a strategic choice made by a manager) with the 
perceived outcomes.  
 
Fieldwork and methods 
The fieldwork was conducted between April and December 2004. The 18 selected projects were 
first studied in a general way attempts were made to identify two persons involved in the 
management of each project. When doubts arose about the identity of the manager(s), experts or 
participants in the project were asked to identify them. 
Next, face-to-face interviews were conducted with the identified managers. These interviews 
involved completing a (large) questionnaire (see Appendix 1 for some examples of the items). 
This was extensive work, but it ensured that the questionnaire was indeed filled out by the right 
person, a crucial point since the research was focused on the choices made by managers in 
complex projects. In some cases, the manager interviewed did not want to fill out the 
questionnaire. For this and other reasons (such as cancelled appointments), we were unable to 
secure the two forms for every project and although 37 interviews were conducted, only 32 
questionnaires were filled out. Although the number of respondents was not high, each 
respondent was the exactly appropriate person and together, the respondents represented a 
significant number of all the possible respondents. 
The material was analyzed in various ways. Besides simple scores for each question and an 
aggregate for each pole of a choice, the correlations between the various poles of each choice 
were analyzedb as well as the correlations between the poles and the aggregate scores of the 
perceived outcomes of the PPP. An overview of all the correlations between the poles of the 
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various choices which also included the aggregated scores of the perceived outcomes can be 
found in Appendix 2. The correlations were also used to determine if a choice was a dilemma or 
not (see further discussion below). In addition, they provided a first impression of the answer to 
the question of which choices (poles) related strongly to (high) perceptions of outcomes. To 
analyze the weighted effect of each choice (pole) on the perceived scores of outcomes, a step-
wise regression analysis was done. This method of analysis involves presuming a causal link 
between a dependent variable, in this case the weighted scores for perceived outcomes on 
content and process, and an independent variable. in this case the poles of the choices, while the 
weight (standardized Beta) determined the direction and scope of the linear relation. Regression 
analysis allowed us to predict the value of the independent variables (in this case the poles of the 
various dilemmas) and an impression of the best predictors of perceived outcomes could 
therefore be obtained. The regression figures of each of the poles with process and/or content 
outcomes are presented in Appendix 3. 
 
When is it a dilemma? 
As discussed earlier, a dilemma arises when managers feel that they have to make a more or less 
forced choice between two options (poles). This can be detected by looking at the correlations of 
the scores of the poles. Poles can have a high or low and a positive or negative correlation. Only 
in the case of a high negative correlation do we speak of a dilemma. Table 3 summarizes the 
possibilities. 
 
Table 3: Possible correlations between the poles of a dilemma 
 High correlation Low correlation 
Positive correlation No dilemma: More attention paid to one 
aspect of strategy goes together with more 
attention paid to another aspect. Managers do 
not choose between aspects but rather, 
combine them. 
No dilemma: More attention paid to one 
aspect of strategy relates to a small 
increase in attention paid to another 
aspect. No trade-off is necessary. 
Negative correlation Dilemma: More attention paid to one aspect 
of manager strategies comes at the price of 
less attention paid to another aspect. 
No dilemma: More attention paid to one 
strategic aspect goes together with a 
small decrease in attention paid to 
another aspect. Managers do not 
perceive a major choice problem. 
 
 
4. Management choices: an overview 
 
This research began with the idea that managers in complex infrastructure projects make choices 
with regard to management strategies and that some of these choices possess the character of a 
dilemma. The first step, of course, is to find out which management choices (the poles) managers 
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consider to be the most important. Thus, the choices managers made with regard to the various 
poles that had been identified were first analyzed, without determining whether these would be 
classified as managerial dilemmas. 
 
Managers’ attention to aspects of choices 
Table 4 presents the importance that managers attribute to the available choice options as a 
percentage. The higher the percentage, the more important managers consider the choice to be. 
Thus, if managers attribute a score of 80% to an option (See Table 4), this means that they 
consider it to be fairly important, while a score of 47% (such as for designing) means that 
managers attribute only limited importance to this aspect of the choice. The scores are derived 
from the managers’ scores on the items in the survey for each aspect or pole of the choice. The 
three items for each pole are computed, with the possible scores ranging from 3 (three times 
strongly disagree being a low score for that pole) to 15 points (3 time strongly agree being a high 
score on that pole). Thus, 80% means that managers score an average of a 4 (on a scale ranging 
from 1 to 5) on a pole for the items. 
The scores are provided for all managers but also separately for public and private managers. 
Public managers are all employed by a public organization (municipality, county or other public 
organization). Private managers are employed by a private organization (mostly private firms or 
consultancy agencies). 
 
Table 4: The importance managers attach to different poles (in %) of a managerial choice  
Managers Choices 
All managers Public managers Private managers 
Interaction with parties    
1. Involvement – Manageability 80-63 82-64 76-61 
2. Variety – Representation 65-69 66-66 63-75 
3. Horizontal – Vertical 72-56 73-52 67-63 
4. Openness – Closed-ness 46-51  50-47 38-57 
Strategic orientation 
 
   
5. Support – Decisiveness 68-58 70-58 64-58 
6. Communication - Conflict  72-61 74-64 70-55 
7. Joint fact-finding - Stand-alone 
process 
69-69 70-65 68-74 
8. Trust – Contracts 50-49 49-50 53-48 
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Style of Management 
 
   
9. Results – Interaction 63-59 62-61 65-56 
10. Internal – External 68-67 69-67 68-67 
11. Reactive – Proactive 64-62 64-62 64-62 
12. Flexible – Determined 71-57 76-56 61-58 
Process dynamics 
 
   
13. Content – Process 61-68 61-66 61-72 
14. Goal Realization – Goal searching 54-68 51-65 59-73 
15. Designing – Developing 47-56 46-57 48-55 
16. Commitment – Discretion 73-51 73-52 74-48 
Note: the percentage scores of 32 managers (22 public, 10 private) are derived scores (maximum of 15 points [=a 5 
on each item] for each pole and a minimum of 3 points. The scores can vary from 20% (3 points) to 100% (15 
points), so 80% is an average of a 4 on a 5-point scale.  
 
On the basis of Table 4, it can be concluded that there are choices and poles or aspects of those 
choices that receive more attention and others that receive less attention from the managers 
involved in the complex decision-making processes studied.  
- Involvement versus manageability. Both poles of this choice have relatively high scores but the 
involvement score comes out tops at 80% (manageability is significantly lower at 63%). Public 
managers score slightly higher on involvement than private managers. 
- Horizontal versus vertical. There is relatively more attention paid to horizontal strategies in 
projects (72%) than vertical ones. This is not surprising given the complexity of the spatial 
projects studied. Managers pay more attention to aspects such as mutual decision-making and 
horizontal communication that fit into a horizontal view of the project. It is striking that private 
managers focus more on vertical organization strategies than public managers (63% versus 
52%). 
- Communication versus conflict. For this choice, substantial attention is paid to strategies that 
focus on communication (overall score of 72%) for both public and private managers, as well as 
for individual managers’ scores and project scores. Private managers appear to choose 
conflicting strategies less than public managers (55% versus 64%). 
- Flexible versus determined. Strategies focused on flexibility receive substantial attention from 
managers (71%). Public managers seem to pay more attention to this than private managers 
(76% versus 61%). 
- Commitment versus discretion. There is relatively more attention paid to strategies aimed at 
establishing commitment (73%) as compared to those aimed at discretion that enhance the 
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amount of room to manoeuvre (51%). There is very little difference between public and private 
managers in this choice. 
 
There are also a number of choices that receive relatively little attention. These include: 
- Openness versus closed-ness. Strategies focused on openness and closed-ness both received 
relatively little attention from managers (46% and 51%). What is striking here is that private 
managers find openness less important than public managers (38% versus 50%). The reverse is 
also true: public managers have less appreciation for closed-ness than private managers (47% 
versus 57%). 
- Contracts versus trust. Here, too, there is a low score of around 50% for both types of strategies 
and there are no major differences between public and private managers. 
- Goal realization versus goal searching. Goal realization receives less attention than goal 
searching (54% versus 68%). Private managers tend to focus slightly more on goal realisation 
than public managers (59% versus 51%). 
 
Public and private managers: differences in management choices 
Table 4 reveals some interesting differences in management choices between public and private 
managers. Public managers tend to pay a bit more attention to involvement, flexibility and 
variety than private managers, who tend to focus on representation, vertical relationships, closed-
ness and determination. Private managers also appear to emphasize goal realization and goal 
searching while public managers place more emphasis on variety. The most important 
differences between public and private managers are summarized in Table 5. Tables 4 and 5 
show that on the one hand, most managers seem to make the same choices, which leads to the 
conclusion that these complex processes evoke some similar managerial strategies. On the other 
hand, some differences can be observed and the standard image of public actors focusing more 
on stakeholder involvement and openness and private actors focusing on efficiency and speed is 
more or less confirmed (see Klijn/Teisman, 2003). However, the differences are not always that 
stark.  
 
Table 5: Differences between public and private managers in their management choices 
 Public managers (N = 22) Private managers (N = 10) 
Interaction with parties Pay more attention to openness and a bit more to 
aspects of involvement as well as variety. 
Pay more attention to closed-ness, 
representation and vertical 
relationships. 
Strategic orientation Focus on strategies of conflict and slightly more on 
support, paying less attention to strategies aimed at 
collecting knowledge through a stand-alone process. 
Use conflict strategies less and 
emphasize research as a stand-alone 
process. 
Style of project leadership More attention paid to strategies focused on 
flexibility and a bit more on interaction. 
Use fewer strategies aimed at 
flexibility. 
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Process dynamics Focus a bit less on strategies aimed at goal 
achievement and goal searching. 
Focus a bit more on strategies of goal 
achievement and goal searching. 
General More focus on openness, variety and involvement. 
Less reluctant on conflict strategies and more 
attention paid to flexibility and less to goal 
achievement and goal searching. 
Conclusion: This type of manager is focused on 
openness and flexibility but also on the consent of 
other actors in the process. 
More inclined to keep processes closed, 
tend to use conflict strategies less and 
emphasize goal achievement more. 
Conclusion: This type of manager is 
focused on speed, individual knowledge 
gathering and goal achievement. 
 
 
5. Choices made by managers: dilemmas or not? 
 
One of the key questions in this research paper is whether managers experience a choice as a 
dilemma. In order to assess this, strong negative correlations between the aspects of choices 
made by managers must be observed. As mentioned in the previous sections, there are 32 aspects 
organized into 16 pairs, which had earlier been thought to form dilemmas.  
 
A closer look at the dilemmas 
In observing the 16 pairs and their correlations (See Appendix 2), it can be seen that only three 
pairs of aspects are negative correlated (significant on P <0.1). The pairs of involvement and 
manageability and of goal realization and goal searching are positively correlated. This means 
that both aspects have high scores. Clearly, then, managers do not experience these two types of 
choices as opposites or even as dilemmas. The poles in these aspects of management choices can 
be reconciled with each other. 
This is not the case, however, with the pairs of support and action, research as joint fact-finding 
and research as stand-alone process and designing versus developing. These three pairs are all 
negative correlated so that a high score on one aspect occurs in tandem with a low score on the 
other. Here is where the real dilemmas for the managers can be found. Table 6 provides an 
overview based on the correlations found in Appendix 2:  
 
Table 6.  Managerial choices: dilemmas or not? 
Choices Correlation between the poles 
(significant at P <0.1) 
Character 
 
1. Involvement versus manageability Yes, positively related. No dilemma, managers focus on both 
managerial strategies at the same 
time. 
2. Variety versus representation No No dilemma 
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3. Horizontal versus vertical 
relationships 
No No dilemma 
4. Openness versus closed-ness No No dilemma 
5. Support versus action Yes, negative correlated Dilemma 
6. Communication versus conflict No No dilemma 
7. Research as joint fact-finding 
versus research as a stand-alone 
process 
Yes, negative correlation Dilemma 
8. Trust in interaction versus contracts 
and clear agreements 
No No dilemma 
9. Result oriented versus relationship 
oriented 
No No dilemma 
10. Internal orientation versus external 
orientation 
No No dilemma 
11. Reactive versus proactive No No dilemma 
12. Flexible versus determined No No dilemma 
13. Steering for substance versus 
steering for process 
No No dilemma 
14. Goal realization versus goal 
searching 
Yes, positively correlated No dilemma managers focus on both 
managerial strategies at the same 
time 
15. Designing versus developing Yes, negative correlation Dilemma 
16. Commitment versus discretion No No dilemma 
 
 
Reflection on dilemmas: avoiding choices? 
The above outcomes show that managers have considerably fewer problems in making choices 
than at least some of the literature around project and process management suggests. This does 
not mean that managers consider the choices to be unimportant. It was earlier observed that there 
are, in fact, several strategic choices that managers considered to be important. The conclusion is 
more that managers seem to reconcile or avoid choices in management strategies. They either see 
no really dilemma and connected forced choices, or as in two other cases, try to find a way to 
reconcile both strategic choices. 
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This may be a kind of survival strategy, where one pole of a dilemma is chosen at one time and 
the other at another time. Alternatively, the managers may have found effective ways to 
reconcile the managerial choices. Further research is required in order to be able to provide 
evidence for these theories, but given our knowledge of these types of projects and the 
complexity of the decision-making processes (see for instance De Bruijn et all, 2004; Klijn, 
2007; Van Gils/Klijn 2007 for several of the cases), we believe that both theories represent some 
part of the truth.  
 
 
6. Do management choices matter: perceived outcomes of managers 
 
In the questionnaire, managers were asked to provide judgement on the outcomes of PPP 
projects. A distinction was made between process and substantive outcomes. Several indicators 
were used to measure these two types of outcomes (See table 7 below). The respondents were 
asked to score the indicators between 1 (low satisfaction) and 5 (high satisfaction).  
 
Judgement on the outcomes 
The average results from the managers of the indicators and their overall scores for content and 
process are presented in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7:  Perceived judgments of managers on outcome indicators 
Outcome Indicator Average 
judgment 
N=32 
Content indicators 
 
 
1. Parties have elaborated on innovative aspects or added new substantive aspects: in subsequent 
substantive plans and intentions, innovation is visible in the desired product or in the manner of 
organising. 
4,38 
2. Parties who are affected by decisions find that they have had input in the proposals.  4,00 
3. Parties find that different (spatial) functions are connected with one another (e.g. housing/ 
working/ recreation/et cetera). 
4,44 
4. Parties believe that the solutions they worked at collaboratively really addressed the problems.  4,16 
5. Parties find that the substantive proposals suffice for future developments. 3,81 
6. Parties believe that versions of the project (proposals/plans), including the costs of drawing the 
proposals, provide more benefits than the cost.  
3,69  
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Content average score 
 
4,08 
PROCESS INDICATORS 
 
 
1. Parties are content about the manner in which they have been involved in elaborating the project 
management.  
3,66 
2. Parties believe that the project leadership has adequately managed conflict between those 
involved. 
3,72 
3. During the process, parties have not experienced major stagnations in interaction as frustrating.  2,94 
4. Parties have interacted with various other parties.  4,22 
5. Parties have frequently interacted with one another.  4,53 
Process: average score 
 
3,81 
 
It can be seen that managers are relatively satisfied with both outcomes for the content and 
process of PPP projects. Managers score significantly higher on content than on process (P 
<0.05) and there is no significant difference between public and private managers when their 
judgments are compared. 
Especially high scores can be found for innovative aspects (content indicator 1) and the judgment 
on the way different (spatial) functions are combined with each other in the project (content 
indicator 3). On the process indicators, high scores are found for the judgment about variety and 
frequency of interactions (indicators 4 and 5) while a relative low score is found for the judgment 
on major stagnations as frustrating. It can therefore be concluded that the stagnations and 
deadlocks in the processes of these projects, which usually take a long period of time, are clearly 
the most negative to managers.  
 
Correlating managerial aspects with outcomes 
One key question is how management choices are related to outcomes. The various managerial 
choices have been correlated with the perceived outcome measurements that were presented 
above (see Appendix 2). Content and process have been found to be strongly correlated to each 
other (correlation 0.69). This is not surprisingly because it is expected that if the process receives 
an overall good score, this should be somehow reflected in the outcomes in most of the cases. 
This of course means that strategies that are good for process outcomes are also indirectly good 
for content outcomes. 
 
Table 8:  Correlations (P <0.1) between management choices and substantive and process outcomes 
 20 
 Positive correlations  Negative correlations 
Content Vertical relationships, reactive  
Process Horizontal relationships, research as joint fact-finding, 
relationship oriented, flexible, goal searching, content 
Discretion 
Content and 
process 
Manageability, communication, result oriented, commitment  
 
 
Table 8 (based on the correlations in Appendix 2) shows some differences between the 
correlations of the management choices with indicators for content and process. There are some 
choices that correlate with both process and content outcomes. An emphasis on manageability, 
communication, being result oriented and commitments of managerial strategies have a positive 
impact on both content and process. The perceived outcomes for content are positively correlated 
to vertical relationships and a reactive style of project management. Process outcomes, however, 
are improved by focusing on horizontal relationships. Other managerial aspects that have a 
positive correlation with process outcomes are also strongly connected to what is emphasized in 
the literature on process management: research as joint fact-finding, being relationship oriented 
and goal searching. 
 
Which strategy to choose: the relative importance of managerial choices 
However useful these correlations are, they do not tell us which strategies are the most 
important. Because of the interrelations between various poles, some may be more important 
than others.  Conducting a step-wise regression analysis is one way to figure out the relative 
importance of the poles in achieving outcomes. 
The results of the step-wise regression analysis (see Appendix 3) show that five strategies are the 
most strongly related to the perceived content score: commitment, vertical relationships, 
discretion, communication and being relationship oriented. These five variables explain 80% of 
the variation of the variable content, where the last variable, being relationship oriented, clearly 
contributes the least to the explanationc. Discretion has a negative influence on the perceived 
content outcomes. It may thus be concluded that if a manager wants to promote better content 
outcomes, he would have to focus on strategies such as commitment but also on vertical 
relationships, communication and being relationship oriented, while avoiding strategies that 
promote discretion. 
Looking at the process outcomes, it is the manager’s strategic choices (poles) of commitment, 
goal searching, representation and contracts which add the most to the explanationd. The first 
two strategic choices have the most impact and are positively related to process outcomes. The 
last two strategic choices have less impact and are both negatively related to process outcomes. 
Thus, managers who want good results in their perceptions should focus on commitment as an 
important managerial strategy because it supports both content and process outcomes. 
Discretion, representation and contracts are clearly not strategic choices to be pursued 
intensively.  
 
 
8. Conclusions: management dilemmas and outcomes 
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This article has presented the findings of a research project on the strategies of managers in 
complex infrastructure PPP projects and the relationship of these strategies to the managers’ 
perceived outcomes of these processes. A large set of managerial choices was constructed based 
on the literature on process and project management, such as the choice between opening up the 
process to other actors (and garnering support in doing so) or closing the process (and increasing 
the speed and reducing the complexity of the decision-making process). The poles of the choices 
more or less represent alternative strategic choices made by managers in the project. Each pole 
was measured separately using three statements. 
Managers were expected to have difficulties in choosing between the two poles of the various 
choices because it is difficult to uphold both at the same time. If managers were unable to choose 
both strategies, these (pairs of) choices were termed as dilemmas. Dilemmas are defined as 
situations in which managers can only perform aspects of strategies (and satisfy the need for 
those strategies) by giving less weight to another aspect of managerial strategy. 
 
It turned out that only three of the 16 pairs researched were really dilemmas in the sense that they 
were negatively correlated. These included the dilemma pairs of action-oriented and support, 
research as joint fact-finding and research as a stand-alone process and designing and 
developing. In these pairs, managers clearly experience a situation where paying more attention 
to one aspect can only be achieved by paying less attention to the other. Two pairs are positively 
correlated (goal realising and goal searching and involvement and manageability), which means 
that managers succeed in paying attention to both aspects of managerial strategies at the same 
time. 
In observing the relationship between the various aspects of managerial strategy with indicators 
for outcomes (as perceived by managers), positive correlations exist for several managerial 
choices with both content indicators and process indicators. The biggest impact on outcome (in 
terms of both content and process) seems to be commitment. Other strategies that managers 
could focus on given the correlations found include communication and being relationship 
oriented. Strategies not to pursue because they are negatively correlated to perceived outcomes 
include discretion, contract and representation. 
 
A further look at the results 
The idea of the research project initially seemed so logical: managers have to choose because 
they cannot uphold two different strategies at the same time. However, perhaps not enough 
justice was done with this assumption to the complexity and ambiguity of complex spatial PPP 
projects. It is perfectly rational for managers not to have to make choices because in this way, 
different actors can remain in the process and decisions are delayed (see Hartley, 2000). Such a 
choice also enhances flexibility and allows the manager to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Thus, not making choices, delaying choices for as long as possible or alternating between 
choices can be logical and sensible to managers in these contexts. 
However, it is probably not just a matter of evading choices. The research also indicates that 
managers seldom have the attention span for a problem for a long time. Managers lead hectic 
lives and are constantly inundated with a wide variety of problems and smaller or larger jobs (see 
Mintzberg and Quin, 1996, Noordegraaf 2000). In such a context, they may not experience 
dilemmas but rather, act strongly according to the logic of the situation. A meeting that may have 
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been meant to be used to control the project may then be used to attach partners to the project 
again. In this way, dilemmas and choices are connected and do not appear to be conflicting. 
 
Further research? 
Therefore, managers do choose but they do so while acting. Managers who are tuned in to the 
situation probably make decisions in complex environmental projects. They may try to exclude 
one pressure group and invite another, they may utilize the media or try to stay away from the 
media as far as possible. It is clear that they choose their managerial strategy according to the 
logic of the situation and an action which is aimed at opening up the network may be forced by 
the circumstances to enhance stakeholders’ commitment to the project. The style of managers 
resembles a hit and run strategy attuned to pressing situations more than a thoughtful choice 
between dilemmas. However, this is a theory that should be addressed through further research 
that focuses more on individual choices made by managers during a period of time. This requires 
a different kind of research: on that is more qualitative and utilizes participating observations. 
This would also make it possible to research the theory for a longer period of time, which would 
prove to be difficult if more quantitative research methods such as those used in this project were 
to be utilized. 
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Appendix 1: Examples of items to measure dilemmas 
(NB the first three items measure the first pole and the second three statements measure the second pole of the dilemma) 
Involvement versus manageability 
1 Relevant public parties are involved through organised forms of 
consultation (platforms etc.). 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
2 Relevant private parties are involved through organised forms 
of consultation.  
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
3 Other relevant societal parties are involved through organised 
forms of consultation.  
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
4 As new subjects or themes are introduced, one always looks 
first whether it fits in planning and budgeting. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
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0 strongly disagree  
5 When new parties announce themselves or wish to participate, 
we always determine whether cost management is jeopardised. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
6 Clear and measurable agreements have been made about the 
deployment of people and means in terms of time and money; 
methods are use to keep the project manageable: phasing, 
planning, milestones. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
Variety versus representativeness 
7 There is room for the input of people, parties and concepts of 
vary different natures (even artists, laypersons, outsiders). 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
8 To the greatest extent possible, the effort is made to make 
different opinions visible and included in decision making.  
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
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0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
9 Assumptions and presuppositions are consciously put up for 
discussion  
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
10 In the selection of people who participate in the process, we 
carefully consider who they represent.  
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
11 Those involved determine their point of view by what the 
parties they represent believe. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
12 Access into the process has been made easier for those 
individuals who clearly represent interest groups.  
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
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0 strongly disagree  
Horizontal relations versus vertical relations 
13 The project organisation is flat and/or shaped as a matrix.  0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
14 Communication and administration occur in one's own 
organisational layer and between the layers.  
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
15 Project leadership consults with the implementers and involves 
them in the decision. Mutual decision making clearly exists. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
16 The project organisation has a hierarchical structure. 0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
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0 strongly disagree  
17 Communication and administration occur between the different 
layers in a top-down fashion. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
18 Project leadership determines what the subordinate organisation 
does. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
Openness versus closedness 
19 No conditions are attached to joining in discussions, in thinking and in 
decision making about the direction of the project. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
20 In every new phase of the project, new parties are found and thus new 
connections are made. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
 29
0 strongly disagree  
21 As far as parties have been selected, this has been carried out in open 
competition. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
22 Project management determines which parties enter the network 
around the project.  
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
23 It is almost impossible for new parties to participate in the project 
organisation. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
24 Project management determines the selection of parties necessary for 
(parts of) the project through mutual consultation. 
0 strongly agree 
0 agree  
0 neutral  
0 disagree   
0 strongly disagree  
 
 30 
Appendix 2 Correlation matrix 
table 1 correlations 
  
Involvem
ent 
M
anageability 
V
ariety 
R
epresentativeness 
H
orizontal relations 
V
ertical relations 
O
penness 
C
losedness 
support 
action(oriented) 
C
om
m
unication 
C
onflict 
R
esearch as joint 
fact finding 
R
esearch as  stand-
alone process 
Trust in teractions 
C
ontracts and clear 
agreem
ents 
R
esult oriented 
R
elation oriented 
Internal orientation 
E
xternal orientation 
R
eactive 
P
ro-active 
Flexible 
g
involvement 1                                              
manageability 0,36 1,00                                            
variety 0,38 0,55 1,00                                          
representativeness 0,20 -0,27 -0,27 1,00                                        
horizontal relations 0,03 0,22 0,07 -0,15 1,00                                      
vertical relations 0,09 0,15 0,19 0,44 -0,08 1,00                                    
openness 0,13 0,23 0,40 -0,16 0,15 0,20 1,00                                  
closedness 0,15 0,41 0,00 0,14 0,09 0,23 0,06 1,00                                
support 0,04 0,27 -0,09 0,14 0,04 -0,13 0,12 0,12 1,00                              
action(oriented) -0,02 0,17 0,08 -0,15 -0,07 0,41 0,08 0,02 -0,35 1,00                            
communication 0,33 0,57 0,39 -0,20 0,12 0,03 0,30 0,06 0,49 -0,16 1,00                          
conflict -0,09 -0,37 -0,16 0,15 0,08 -0,12 0,14 -0,28 0,31 0,00 -0,05 1,00                        
research as joint fact finding -0,02 0,43 -0,04 -0,08 0,27 0,24 0,26 0,32 0,53 -0,05 0,33 0,01 1,00                      
research as stand alone process 0,09 -0,19 0,15 0,14 -0,12 0,47 -0,10 0,18 -0,49 0,26 -0,33 -0,15 -0,34 1,00                    
trust in interactions 0,33 0,23 0,09 0,17 0,03 0,05 0,01 0,42 -0,10 -0,14 0,07 -0,40 -0,35 0,22 1,00                  
contracts and clear agreements 0,19 -0,24 0,16 -0,19 0,09 -0,03 -0,27 -0,14 -0,32 0,05 -0,11 -0,02 -0,26 0,36 -0,30 1,00                
result oriented 0,18 0,30 0,08 0,13 0,27 0,28 -0,05 0,54 0,05 0,29 0,33 0,04 -0,06 0,40 0,28 0,18 1,00              
relation oriented 0,23 0,35 0,17 -0,31 0,41 -0,10 0,32 0,17 0,22 0,15 0,31 0,20 0,44 -0,07 -0,16 -0,13 0,25 1,00            
internal orientation 0,19 -0,21 -0,11 0,21 0,20 0,08 -0,07 -0,47 0,07 -0,01 0,05 0,47 -0,18 -0,03 -0,07 0,06 0,03 0,04 1,00          
extrenal orientation -0,04 0,05 0,03 0,24 0,41 0,08 -0,24 0,06 0,30 -0,14 0,10 0,35 0,16 -0,01 -0,24 0,26 0,27 -0,05 0,16 1,00        
reactive 0,10 0,17 0,24 0,16 0,15 0,07 -0,13 -0,24 0,24 -0,37 0,40 0,01 -0,16 0,02 0,24 -0,10 0,16 -0,14 0,42 0,18 1,00      
proactive 0,00 0,27 0,15 0,03 0,40 0,29 0,04 0,35 -0,10 0,33 0,01 -0,33 -0,03 0,37 0,28 0,06 0,45 0,13 -0,36 0,40 -0,11 1,00    
flexible 0,32 0,36 0,34 -0,17 0,35 -0,16 0,26 -0,16 0,50 -0,08 0,65 0,24 0,21 -0,31 0,03 -0,02 0,19 0,31 0,22 0,44 0,21 0,25 1,00  
rigid -0,04 -0,15 -0,29 0,30 0,07 -0,04 -0,05 -0,14 0,45 -0,29 0,23 0,30 0,00 -0,21 0,11 -0,27 0,13 -0,09 0,51 0,12 0,50 -0,10 0,25 1,
steering for substance 0,14 0,25 0,24 -0,12 -0,14 0,32 0,41 0,09 -0,04 0,22 0,21 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,01 -0,13 0,14 0,33 0,03 -0,36 -0,12 -0,23 0,02 -0
steering for process -0,17 -0,14 -0,21 0,01 0,01 -0,07 -0,13 -0,09 -0,12 0,18 -0,10 0,04 -0,14 0,13 0,00 0,22 0,24 -0,22 -0,02 0,08 0,07 0,06 -0,03 0,
goal realisation 0,24 0,08 0,00 0,15 0,16 0,00 -0,26 0,24 0,01 -0,13 -0,02 -0,02 -0,17 0,30 0,26 0,05 0,42 0,02 0,33 0,09 0,45 0,08 -0,26 0,
goal seeking 0,10 0,26 0,04 0,26 0,20 0,34 0,14 0,25 0,04 0,18 0,14 0,01 0,24 0,14 0,11 -0,26 0,28 0,11 0,01 0,18 0,16 0,20 -0,06 0,
designing 0,22 -0,41 -0,05 0,29 -0,22 -0,16 -0,18 -0,11 -0,11 -0,07 -0,25 0,11 -0,54 0,23 0,18 0,16 0,14 -0,08 0,23 -0,30 0,21 -0,17 -0,33 0,
developing -0,13 -0,03 0,09 -0,02 0,47 0,13 0,22 0,07 -0,14 -0,01 -0,07 -0,04 0,03 0,23 0,13 0,07 0,08 0,13 -0,23 0,39 -0,07 0,51 0,14 -0
Commitment 0,08 0,16 -0,08 0,09 0,36 0,19 -0,09 -0,22 0,10 0,12 0,24 -0,13 0,14 0,02 0,07 -0,07 0,14 0,23 0,21 0,28 0,18 0,34 0,43 0,
discretion -0,14 -0,03 0,18 0,11 -0,21 0,18 0,20 -0,36 0,06 0,04 -0,03 0,19 -0,11 -0,31 -0,19 -0,08 -0,41 -0,47 0,09 0,18 -0,01 -0,02 0,26 0,
content 0,24 0,33 0,10 0,28 0,25 0,45 0,06 0,26 0,16 -0,04 0,41 -0,17 0,26 0,19 0,31 -0,20 0,35 0,14 0,15 0,30 0,38 0,30 0,27 0,
process 0,07 0,41 0,01 -0,10 0,55 0,17 0,22 0,28 0,16 0,03 0,46 -0,24 0,43 -0,14 0,17 -0,28 0,33 0,40 0,10 0,08 0,22 0,27 0,32 0,
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Most important regression analysis 
 The most important choices (poles) are presented here for content and process outcomes that come out of the step-wise regression 
analysis. The regression analyses are presented with content or process as a dependent variable (an average of the item scores that 
range from 1 to 5) and one of the poles as the independent variable. The independent variable is constructed by summing the 
scores for the three items that make up the variable and can vary from 3 to 15.  
____ 
15141312 11 10 9 
Commitment (3-15)
5,00 
4,50 
4,00 
3,50 
3,00 
contentt 
R Sq Linear = 0,228
 
__ 
131211109 8 7 6 
Vertical relations  (3-15)
5,00 
4,50 
4,00 
3,50 
3,00 
content
R Sq Linear = 0,206
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14131211 10 9 
communication (3-15)
5,00 
4,50 
4,00 
3,50 
3,00 
content
R Sq Linear = 0,17
 
 
121110 9 8 
Interaction (3-15) 
5,00 
4,50 
4,00 
3,50 
3,00 
content 
R Sq Linear = 0,02
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 1211109 8 7 6 5 
discretion (3-15)
5,00 
4,50 
4,00 
3,50 
3,00 
content
R Sq Linear = 0,086
 
MOST IMPORTANT CHOICES FOR PROCESS OUTCOMES 
 
15141312 11 10 9 
Commitment (3-15)
5,00 
4,50 
4,00 
3,50 
3,00 
process
R Sq Linear = 0,292
__ 
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__ 
15141312 11 10 9
goalsearching (3-15)
5,00 
4,50 
4,00 
3,50 
3,00 
Process
R Sq Linear = 0,129
 
 
14131211 10 9 87 
representativeness  (3-15) 
5,00 
4,50 
4,00 
3,50 
3,00 
Process
R Sq Linear = 0,01
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1211109 8 7 
 Contracts (3-15)
5,00 
4,50 
4,00 
3,50 
3,00 
Process
R Sq Linear = 0,079
 
 
Endnotes 
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a In that small research project, the respondents were forced to choose between the dilemmas, a method not used again in this 
project (see section on methods). 
 
b Each score of a pole was determined by a summed score of the three items that made up the pole. 
c The regression analysis shows the formula content= 1,250+ 0,162 commitment+ 0,129 vertical relations- 0,142 
discretion+ 0,159 communication- 0,085 being relationship oriented (see Klijn et all, 2006). 
d The regression analysis show the following formula: process= 1,65+0.220 commitment+ 0,129 goal searching- 
0,084 representation - 0,104 contracts. 
